This paper examines the introduction of premiums into the SCHIP program in Kentucky. Kentucky introduced a $20 monthly premium for SCHIP coverage for children with family incomes between 151% and 200% of the federal poverty level in December 2003. Administrative data between 2001 and 2004 is used to estimate a Cox proportional hazard model that predicts enrollment duration in this premium-paying category. The results suggest that a premium reduces the length of enrollment and that the effect is much stronger in the first two months after the introduction of the premium. Similar results are not found for the non-premium category.
I.

Introduction
The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was created by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 under Title XXI of the Social Security Act. Its purpose was to initiate and expand health insurance coverage for uninsured, low-income children.
The statute set a broad outline for the program's structure and gave states flexibility in creating programs to meet their own needs. States could create or expand their own separate insurance programs, expand their Medicaid program, or some combination of the two. The federal government would reimburse states for SCHIP expenses according to a matching rate based on state income. The 1998 federal budget allocated $24 billion dollars to the states for SCHIP.
The flexibility provided by the federal government included giving states the ability to vary the amount of cost sharing imposed in a separate (non-Medicaid) SCHIP program, subject to certain limits. Premiums and co-payments may not exceed 5% of family income for children whose family incomes exceed 150% of the federal poverty level (FPL). There is a much lower limit on cost sharing for children in families with income below 150% FPL. According to a report published by the Kaiser Commission (Ross and Cox (2005) ), as of July 2004, 33 states imposed premiums or annual enrollment fees for SCHIP coverage, with 11 states charging premiums for children in families with incomes of 101% FPL and above.
Because average state public insurance spending growth has exceeded the growth in state tax revenue in past several years, some states have introduced or increased premiums in their SCHIP programs.
1 According to Ross and Cox (2005) In this paper, the impact of the introduction of a premium on the duration of premium-paying SCHIP enrollment spells in Kentucky is examined using a Cox proportional hazard model. This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of premiums in a number of ways. First, data on child enrollment in all public insurance is used to observe whether or not children move into other categories of public insurance after leaving the premium-paying category of SCHIP. In some states, administrative data is stored in such a way so that movements between SCHIP and Medicaid cannot be tracked. Second, unlike the previous studies, different specifications are used to assess whether the short run impact of the policy change differed in magnitude from the longer run impact. Third, because Kentucky has a premium-paying and a non-premium-paying category in its SCHIP program, enrollment spells from the non-premium-paying category can by used to help determine if the relationship observed between premiums and enrollment in the premium-paying category is causal.
The results suggest that the introduction of a premium has a negative impact on the length of enrollment in the premium-paying SCHIP category and that the effect is much stronger in the first two months following the policy change than in the subsequent months. The estimated probability that an average child ends their enrollment spell in the first two months following the introduction of the premium is 21%. The estimated probability of leaving in the subsequent seven months is 5.43%. These estimates should be compared to the average monthly exit probability in the data, which is 5.02%. Similar results are not found for the non-premium-paying SCHIP category. These findings are potentially useful to other states considering imposing or increasing premiums in their own SCHIP programs.
In the next section, the literature described above is discussed in more detail, as is the relationship between the literature and this paper. In section three, programmatic features of the SCHIP program in Kentucky are described as well as the data used in the analysis. Section four discusses the Cox proportional hazard model estimated in this paper and section five presents the results. The final section offers conclusions, extensions, and policy implications.
II. Literature Review
As mentioned above, Shenkman et al. (2002) and Shenkman and Vogel (2005) From a policy perspective, a natural question is whether movements from premium-paying SCHIP to other public coverage (non-premium-paying SCHIP or Medicaid) should be considered an "exit" since the child is continuing to receive public coverage. In this paper, I follow Allison (2003) and treat continued enrollment in other public coverage as a part of a child's premium-paying SCHIP enrollment spell. For example, in the previous literature, if a child was enrolled in premium-paying SCHIP for 6 months and then transferred to Medicaid for 5 months before leaving public coverage entirely, their enrollment spell would be assigned a length of 6 months. In this paper, I
assign the spell a length of 11 months.
The Florida studies as well as the Kenney et al. (2005) As mentioned, the approach used in the Florida studies, as well as Kenney et al. (2005) , had been to measure the spell as lasting 12 months. Table 2 illustrates the total number of first new KCHIP III spells that start in each of the 33 months analyzed and then breaks the monthly total down by spell origin (a move from no public coverage, from Medicaid, or from KCHIP II). Notice that the first 24 cohorts start their enrollment spells prior to the introduction of the premium and that the last 9 cohorts start their enrollment spells after the premium was introduced. The analyzed. Of these exits, 6% were due to the child turning 19, 19% were due to nonpayment of the premium, and 75% were due to some "other" reason. This implies that 25,239 children, or 55% of all children in the sample, were still enrolled on August 31, 2004. These spells are treated as right censored.
Descriptive statistics for all children and by exit route are presented in Table 4 .
There are more children aged 1-5 or 6-12 than aged 13-18 in the data. There are almost as many female children as males. Non-whites make up 12% of all spells, but notice that 16% of the spells that end in non-payment represent non-white children. The average number of siblings also covered under public coverage is 1.15 children and the average spell length in the data is 8.51 months. Although 24% of all spells are covered under a managed care program within KCHIP, 29% of spells that end in non-payment come from managed care. Finally note that relative to all new KCHIP III spells, spells that start as a result of a move from no previous public coverage are more likely to end in non-payment (29% versus 37%). KCHIP III spells that start as a result of a move from Medicaid or KCHIP II are less likely to end in non-payment.
IV. Model
The decision being modeled is whether a family with a child enrolled in KCHIP III chooses to exit public coverage. I assume that the family compares the expected utility from leaving public coverage to that from remaining. A family chooses to leave if the expected pay-off from leaving is higher than from staying. This depends on the net income associated with each alternative. By assumption, families face this decision on a monthly basis.
To be more specific, the duration of the KCHIP III enrollment spells described above is estimated using a Cox proportional hazard model with time varying covariates to model the yearly recertification process and the introduction of the premium.T P
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The model used here is essentially the same as the model estimated in the Meyer (1990) study of the duration of unemployment benefits. The notation used in the Meyer (1990) study is adopted here. Let TB i B be the length of child i's KCHIP III enrollment spell. Using this notation, the hazard for child i at time t, λB i B (t), is defined as follows:
(
The hazard is parameterized using a proportional hazards format: Cox (1972) for further discussion.
Here λB 0 B (t) is the baseline hazard at time t, which is unknown. XB i B (t) is a vector of time dependent explanatory variables for child i that include dummies for yearly recertification, dummies to capture the short run and the long run impact of the policy change, the demographic variables described in table 4, and a series of regional controls.
Finally, β is a vector of coefficients associated with the explanatory variables and is unknown. Because controls for the recertification process are included in XB i B (t), no formal attempt will be made to estimate the baseline hazard λB 0 B (t). Instead, I will use the average monthly exit probability in the KCHIP III sample, 5.02%, as an estimate of the average hazard when interpreting the estimated coefficients of the model.
The probability that a KCHIP III enrollment spell lasts until t can be written as a function of the hazard:
where
and it is assumed that XB i B (t) is constant between time periods. The log-likelihood function for a sample of N children can be written as: Unlike Meyer (1990) , I will not, in addition, control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level. Instead, in the estimation of the standard errors, I will take into account family level correlation between observations. This is essentially the same as controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (or shared frailty) at the family level. One could argue that for decisions regarding enrollment and eligibility for public health insurance that heterogeneity at the family level is what really matters. Eligibility is determined at the family level and the premiums are assessed at the family level in Kentucky. Controlling for heterogeneity at the level of an individual child level may cause one to ignore characteristics of siblings that influence that child's insurance status. Table 5 in order to assess whether the short run impact of the premium was felt differently by different sub-groups. These interactions imply that some care needs to be taken when interpreting the coefficients. The main effect of each variable must be considered along with the effect of its interaction with any others when describing the complete effect of the variable on enrollment duration.
V. Results
The last column gives the "absolute" effect for each explanatory variable, evaluated at the sample means. This column may be the most appropriate to discuss since it combines the main effects and the interaction effects for each variable. In order to understand how to interpret these numbers, consider Recert 1. The table says that when an average child's spell lasts until the first recertification period the probability of exiting at that point is 17%, holding everything else constant. It is natural to ask whether or not that seems like a high number. The question is, compared to what? As mentioned previously, I am using the average monthly exit probability in the KCHIP III sample (5.02%) as a proxy for the average hazard including the baseline hazard, so the numbers in the column describing the absolute effects should be compared to 5.02%. Thus the absolute effects for both the first recertification (17%) and the second recertification (11%) are much larger than the baseline hazard. Despite this, the magnitude of the recertification impact on enrollment may be lower here than in other studies because transfers to other public coverage are not treated as exits. Presumably a large portion of these transfers occur during the recertification period when the state assesses the family's eligibility status. If these transfers were treated as exits, then the magnitude of the effects of the recertification variables would be higher.
The most striking result is the large exit probability associated with the first two months after the premium is introduced. If the average child is enrolled when the premium is introduced, then the probability they exit public coverage in the next two months is 21%, holding everything else constant. The long run premium dummy suggests that if they remain enrolled during the first two months after the premium is introduced, then they have a 5.43% chance of exiting in the subsequent seven months, holding everything else constant. Notice that this is slightly higher than the baseline hazard of 5.02%. This suggests that the impact of premiums on enrollment is different in the short run and in the long run.
In order to determine which short run / long run combination best fits the data, I
estimated separate specifications for a 1 month short run, 8 month long run division all the way to a 7 month short run, 2 month long run division. A summary of the results is presented in table 6. The model presented in table 5 dominates the other specifications because it has the maximum log likelihood value. As one moves down the table the short run effect falls as more of months 3-9 after the policy change are averaged together with the first two months.
One way to interpret these results is to assume that families with children in KCHIP III decide right away whether or not they are willing to pay the premium. Those that choose not to pay exit quickly. That would account for the large short run impact of the policy change. Along those same lines, families that do not want to pay the premium may be less likely to sign up after the premium is introduced. This would explain why the long run exit probability does not look very different from the average hazard.
The estimated effects of many of the interaction terms are statistically significant.
The interaction terms on the non-white indicator and the managed care indicator are larger than one, but the absolute effects of these variables are below the average hazard.
The Kenney et al. (2005) study finds evidence that premiums have a differential impact on non-whites and children covered by managed care. The difference here may be due to the fact that these sub-populations could be more likely to move from KCHIP III into other public coverage, so that the increased chances of exiting observed in the Kenney study may have actually been an increased chance of moving into other public coverage.
Although the introduction of the premium was an exogenous change to the price of KCHIP III coverage, there is still the question of whether the relationship between the introduction of the premium and the subsequent exits from the public coverage causal.
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One way of addressing the issue of causality is to find a group similar to the KCHIP III enrollees that did not experience the increase in price and use them as a control group.
One possible control group is the set of children enrolled in KCHIP II during the same time. Children enrolled in KCHIP II were not subject to the premium, though they were subject to similar conditions as KCHIP III children otherwise. The main difference between the two groups is that, by definition, children in KCHIP II have lower income than children in KCHIP III. In order to compare KCHIP II enrollment spells with KCHIP III, data on all new KCHIP II enrollment spells initiated during the same 33 months are analyzed.
Descriptive statistics for the 82,839 first new KCHIP II enrollment spells for children aged 1-18 with complete demographic data are provided in Table 7 . 10 KCHIP II children are more likely to be age 6-12 and to be non-white. On average, KCHIP II children have more siblings and shorter enrollment spells. They are also much more likely to have transferred from Medicaid than the KCHIP III children.
The same Cox proportional hazard model estimated for KCHIP III enrollment spells is estimated using KCHIP II enrollment spells in Table 8 . The coefficient on the short run post-policy indicator is not individually significant and a joint test of this coefficient with all of the interaction coefficients yields an insignificant result. Though not statistically significant, the absolute effect of the premium in the short run, 4.43%, is slightly greater than the average monthly exit rate for the KCHIP II sample, which is 4.01%. This suggests that if KCHIP III children are similar to KCHIP II children, other than the fact that one group was required to pay premiums, one can safely attribute the change in the behavior of the KCHIP III children after the premium was introduced to the policy change itself.
VI. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of the introduction of a premium on enrollment in a state's SCHIP program. Administrative data from Kentucky is ideally suited to answer this question, since Kentucky recently introduced a premium into its SCHIP program. Unlike the previous literature on premiums, this paper does not treat transfers into other public coverage as an exit from the premium-paying category of SCHIP. This helps to ensure that the length of the enrollment spell is measured accurately.
A second innovation of this paper is to model the impact of the premium as having a different effect in the first two months immediately following the policy change relative to the subsequent months. The results suggest that the impact of the premium on enrollment was much stronger in the first two months than in the subsequent months, so modeling the policy change as having a uniform effect would not be appropriate for
Kentucky. The split between short and long run was determined by estimating different specifications and choosing the one with the highest log likelihood value.
An additional innovation of this paper is that the non-premium-paying SCHIP population in the state is used as a control group in order to assess whether the relationship between the premium and the enrollment changes in the premium-paying SCHIP category is causal. Because a joint test on the short run policy change indicator and all of its interactions was not statistically significant in the control group, it can be inferred that there is a causal relationship between premiums and enrollment changes in the premium-paying category of SCHIP.
These results suggest that perhaps recipients and potential recipients adjust quickly to the introduction of more cost sharing. As mentioned, one way to interpret the results is that families decide right away whether they are going to pay the premium and exit the program immediately if they choose not to pay. In addition, because much higher exit probabilities are not found after the initial adjustment, perhaps potential recipients not willing to pay the premium are not signing up for the program after the premium is in place. States considering changes in their own SCHIP premiums may find these results useful as they attempt to predict the likely impact of any policy changes on the enrollment in their programs. This is especially true for states that are considering the introduction of premiums for the first time.
There are several extensions of interest that would shed further light on the impact of premiums. With more months of data one could observe the recertification process for children that entered after the premiums were introduced. Merging this administrative data with claims data would allow for comparisons of the impact of the premium across health types for children to estimate how the policy change impacts the sickest children in the program. Finally, if the state decides to increase premiums in the future, one could compare that response to the response generated by the initial introduction of a premium. • Note that one cannot directly compare each month, because as one moves down the table the number of new spells per month are higher than the number of exits. This implies there are more children "eligible" to exit during the later dates. -196,307.35 Controls for region of residence are included but not presented and the standard errors are adjusted for family level correlation.
Note that the large estimated coefficient on the short run premium dummy may be misleading. One should not consider this coefficient without the coefficients on the associated interaction terms. For this reason, the last column provides the absolute effect of each variable. The absolute effect combines the main effect of each variable with any effects working through interactions with other variables. The estimated absolute effect of the policy change in the short run appears more reasonable. * = individual coefficient significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1% Controls for region of residence are included but not presented and the standard errors are adjusted for family level correlation. * = individual coefficient significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1% 
